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Brain Theory Between 
Utopia and Dystopia: 
Neuronormativity Meets 
the Social Brain 
Charles T. Wolfe
The brain in its plasticity and inherent “sociality” can 
be proclaimed and projected as a revolutionary organ. 
Far from the old reactions which opposed the authen-
ticity of political theory and praxis to the dangerous 
naturalism of “cognitive science” (with images of men 
in white coats, the RAND Corporation or military LSD 
experiments), recent decades have shown us some of 
the potentiality of the social brain (Vygotsky, Negri, 
and Virno). Is the brain somehow inherently a utopian 
topos? If in some earlier papers I sought to defend 
naturalism against these reactions, here I consider 
a new challenge: the recently emerged disciplines of 
neuronormativity, which seek in their own way to over-
come the nature-normativity divide. This is the task of 
a materialist brain theory today. 
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The Setup: Horns of a Dilemma 
There is a lingering zone of what one might think of as sore cognitive muscle 
tissue in the area of materialism. It is an area of both contested territory and 
in some cases, a kind of pathos of distance of the “Ugh! Keep that thing away 
from me!” sort. I have in mind the combination of materialism as an emanci-
patory socio-political project (which need not be construed in strictly Marx-
Engels terms, if we think of Lucretius et al.) and as a cold-hearted “spontane-
ous philosophy of the men in white coats,” e.g., nefarious neurophilosophers. 
Faced with this rather massive alternative, this choice between two projects, 
I have stubbornly been saying since some discussions with Negri in the late 
90s,1 we should choose: both! And for people steeped in a Germanic tradition, 
I can push the following familiar button and say, “this is also about ceasing 
to take for granted a distinction between Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften 
(i.e., the natural sciences and the humanities).” If the brain is always already 
social, as even Marx states (Virno 2001), this implies, although not with neces-
sary implicature, that knowledge of the brain is not irrelevant to knowledge 
of the social world.2 No absolute divide between a hermeneutical world of 
free, self-interpreting subjects with their values, norms, and struggles, and a 
natural world of quantities, electroencephalograms, “men in white coats” and 
so-called “science.”
But even this choice of both, in which the brain is, now a naturalistic object 
of study like a liver or a lung, now a political object (dual-aspect?), leads us, 
like a gamer-agent in a virtual world, into further pathways with further 
choices of which doors to go through. For the brain is frequently presented 
both as a potential site and substance of radical transformation—a utopian 
form of “wonder tissue,” a “difference machine,” an “uncertain system,” and, 
quite symmetrically, as the focus and resource of consumer neuroscience, 
semiocapital3 or neurocapitalism. It’s a bit like the old chestnut about the 
saving power lying where the greatest danger is,4 except the other way round. 
Indeed, regarding the fields of neuronormativity, Slaby and Gallagher have 
recently observed that “the particular construal of self currently championed 
by social neuroscience—with a focus on social-interactive skills, low-level 
empathy and mind-reading—neatly corresponds with the ideal skill profile of 
today’s corporate employee” (Slaby and Gallagher 2014).
1 See Negri’s rather subtle comments on forms of materialism, from the more naturalistic 
to the more political, in the original Italian preface to Alma Venus (Negri 2000).
2 See Wolfe 2010. The “general productive forces of the social brain” appears in Marx’s 
Grundrisse, notebooks VI-VII, a text known as the “Fragment on Machines” (Marx 1973, 
694) which has had particular influence on the Italian Autonomist tradition (see also 
Virno 2001). 
3 Franco Berardi’s term for our world of “post-Fordist modes of production” (see Terra-
nova 2014).
4 “Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst/Das Rettende auch” (Hölderlin, “Patmos,” 1803).
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This brain dilemma is not exactly the opposition between the natural and the 
normative, with natural as a loose association of positions which have a lack of 
fear of “science” or “naturalism” in common, since they consider a continuum 
of theorizing social and political action, for instance, in light of knowledge 
of the structure of the affects: a conglomerate in which Vygotskyan concep-
tions of brain and society, Negri’s conceptions of general intellect and social 
brain, and loosely political versions of neurophilosophy come together. Here, 
natural asserts that the brain is social and material (and that this combination 
is potentially emancipatory), whereas normative, like Cassandra, warns of 
danger.5 For this kind of denunciation can come not from old style humanistic 
Marxism, but from farther left, as with Tiqqun’s piece of learned, paranoid 
critique of the dangers of “the cybernetic hypothesis” (Tiqqun 2001).6 
Faced with this kind of knee-jerk, or is it die-hard, anti-cognitivism, one could 
respond by reassuring the interlocutor: no, tovarich, I may read the neurophi-
losophers Churchlands (1986, 2002) but my heart is in the right place. One can 
also suggest that such a critique is a kind of paleo-Marxism, not up to date 
with immaterial and cognitive turns. I might suggest more broadly a clas-
sic “divide and conquer” move: what would the anti-cognitivist say about a 
thinker like Guattari, who denied, “as opposed to a thinker such as Heidegger,” 
that “the machine is something which turns us away from being”? 
I think that the machinic phyla are agents productive of being. They make 
us enter into what I call an ontological heterogenesis. . . . The whole ques-
tion is knowing how the enunciators of technology, including biological, 
aesthetic, theoretical, machines, etc., are assembled, of refocusing the 
purpose of human activities on the production of subjectivity or collective 
assemblages of subjectivity. (Guattari 2011, 50)
Biological, aesthetic and we might add, cerebral machines are constitutive 
parts of the production of subjectivity, rather than its “other.” 
Yet perhaps the suspicion towards cognitivism is not just dogmatic, 1950s 
humanist Marxism, even if it has its “knee-jerk” moments. We can see this if 
we now turn to a new case, that of the emergent but already popular dis-
ciplines of neuronormativity. If we seek to achieve some critical distance 
towards these disciplines, it does not mean we are reverting to the anti-
naturalism I have discussed above. That is, we are no longer in a 1980s-style 
opposition between humanists like Ricoeur or Habermas, and neuroscientists/
5 On the anecdotal level, I recall some people warning the Multitudes mailing list in the 
early 2000s that I, the moderator, was a danger (perhaps a RAND Corporation agent?) 
because I was participating in a meeting on brains!
6 Those who attended the Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism conference at the ICI in 
Berlin in March 2013 could hear Maurizio Lazzarato’s denunciation of “cognitivism” and 
“science.”
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propagandists like Changeux (see e.g., Changeux and Ricoeur 2002); we are 
now faced with the rise of the “neuro”-disciplines.
Neurohumanities and Neuronormativity
The prefix neuro- has become ubiquitous in numerous scientific and loosely 
scientific disciplines, offering as it does a surplus of concrete, supposedly 
experimentally substantiated brain explanations for various hotly debated 
phenomena (from punishment and free will to gender and economic deci-
sion-making). But as Jan De Vos has observed, this trend has led to a doubly 
unfortunate effect: the weakening of the relation of any of these projects to 
actual neuroscience, and the weakening of the discipline of which they are the 
“neuro” version (De Vos 2014; see also Ortega and Vidal 2011). De Vos quotes 
Matthew Taylor, a British Labour Party activist and government adviser under 
Tony Blair, who claimed that insights from neurological research offered a 
more solid base “than previous attempts to move beyond left and right” 
(Taylor 2009). To the 1980s-type fascination with “my brain is my self,” the last 
decade has responded with a particularly vacuous version of a social turn, 
conveyed in a variety of expressions, from “neurocapitalism” and “neuropol-
itics” to the possibility of neuro-enhanced individuals possessing a “neuro-
competitive advantage” (Lynch 2004; Schmitz 2014). 
One problem would be the potentially illusory character of such promised 
developments. But another problem is in a sense the exact opposite, namely, 
if neuro-enhancement is real, what about “the freedom to remain unen-
hanced” in a context where schools, in a country we don’t need to name, are 
coercing parents to medicate their children for attention dysfunction (Farah 
2005, 37)? Or, to mention a different example, treatments for dementia will 
most likely lead to drugs that increase mnemonic recollection or recall in nor-
mal brains as well: would using this drug cross an ethical line from acceptable 
medical treatments to unacceptable cognitive enhancements if given to mem-
bers of the general population (Bickle and Hardcastle 2012)? An even stronger 
embrace of “neurolaw” is, for instance, in a recent essay on “The significance 
of psychopaths for ethical and legal reasoning” by Hirstein and Sifferd (2014). 
If positron emission tomography (PET) studies have already shown that 
some convicted murderers have significantly attenuated functioning in their 
prefrontal cortex (a region known to be involved in cognitive control and plan-
ning), it is an open book for jurists to plead attenuated responsibility in terms 
of prior cerebral dispositions. But they take the reasoning one step further, 
focusing on the specific case of psychopaths and their diminished sense of 
moral empathy or responsibility. Hirstein and Sifferd effectively argue that 
the courts need to be practicing “neurolaw” in order to monitor psychopathic 
prisoners more closely. Somewhere here there is also the danger of so-called 
brain-realism. As per Dumit (2003, see also De Vos ms. and Schmitz 2014), our 
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society seems to place increased weight on brain data compared with other 
kinds of data. A legal concern is that brain scans and other pieces of such 
information will somehow trump other evidence in legal proceedings (Gordijn 
and Giordano 2010, discussed in Bickle and Hardcastle 2012).
So, thinking back to my embracing answer “both!” at the beginning to the 
question: emancipatory materialism or handing ourselves over to men or 
robots in white coats?  Must this “both!” bear the combined masks of the 
neuro-adviser to Tony Blair and that of the philosophers recommending that 
courts practice “neurolaw”? As you may guess, my answer is “no,” or rather 
“niet,” with Soviet accent.
Two Materialisms = Two Brain Theories
Brains are culturally sedimented, permeated in their material architecture by 
our culture, history, and social organization; and this sedimentation is itself 
reflected in cortical architecture, as first clearly argued perhaps by the brilliant 
Soviet neuropsychologist Lev Vygotsky in the early twentieth century. A major 
figure in fields including social psychology, developmental psychology and a 
kind of heretical Marxism (but one not afraid to invoke the brain), Vygotsky 
strongly emphasized the embeddedness of the brain in the social world, 
arguing that there may even be evidence of consequences in our central 
nervous system derived from early social interaction, so that past experience 
is embodied in synaptic modifications. As his younger collaborator Alexan-
der Luria put it, “Social history ties the knots that produce new correlations 
between certain zones of the cerebral cortex” (Luria 2002, 22).7 Less dramati-
cally stated, in a recent summary by the cognitive archaeologist Lambros 
Malafouris: “Our minds and brains are (potentially) subject to constant change 
and alteration caused by our ordinary developmental engagement with 
cultural practices and the material world” (Malafouris 2010): a good definition 
of cultural-cerebral plasticity. Notice that this is materialism sensu stricto, as 
it is a description of the properties of brains; but it is not on the restrictively 
naturalist side of the Churchland-type neurophilosophical program (natural-
ism is a fairly open-ended set of programs, some of which are more open 
onto the social than others). In this more restrictive picture, naturalism begins 
to resemble scientism, in the sense that the promise is made for science to 
replace philosophy: 
It would seem that the long reign of the philosopher as the professional in 
charge of the mind-body problem is finally coming to its end. Just as has 
happened in the lifetime of most of us in the case of the origins of the uni-
verse which used to be a theological problem and is now an astronomical 
7 Iriki 2009 is a recent comparable illustration of this.
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one, so the mind-body problem is about to pass from the grasp of the 
philosopher into that of the neuropsychologist. (Place 1997, 16)
Instead, the mind-brain materialism of Vygotsky is both less passive and less 
mechanistic. For him, “History, changing the human type, depends on the 
cortex; the new socialist man will be created through the cortex; upbringing is 
in general an influence upon the cortex.”8 In this sense it is not a scientism or a 
denial of the symbolic and valuative dimensions of life. Following the helpful 
and suggestive response of John Sutton and Lyn Tribble to Hawkes’ claims that 
materialism will destroy the symbolic, valuative, representational content in 
literature, materialism need not claim that “only matter exists,” but that it is 
instead “firmly pluralist” in its ontologies. 
Even if all the things that exist supervene on or are realized in matter, the 
materialist can still ascribe full-blown reality to tables and trees and ten-
dons and toenails and tangos and tendencies”; an account including the 
brain need not exclude “memories, affects, beliefs, imaginings, dreams, 
decisions, and the whole array of psychological phenomena of interest to 
literary, cultural, and historical theorists. (Sutton and Tribble 2011)
The materialism of the “cultured brain” (as in Vygotsky or recent work in cogni-
tive archaeology on tools and cognition, Iriki 2009) is very much of this sort: it 
integrates the brain and the affects, cerebral architecture, and our aptitude 
to produce fictions, etc. But notice that it is not enough to rebut these visions 
of a cold, dead materialism seizing living value, sentiment and meaning in its 
embrace and reducing them to piles of inert matter. For just as there is bad 
neuronormativity and a more positive sense of the social brain, we must be 
careful to separate the cultured brain concept from “neuro-aesthetics” which 
claims to integrate materialism, brain science and art but in the flattest way: 
I picture a future for writing that dispenses with mystery wherever it can, 
that embraces the astounding strides in thought-organ research. Ideally, 
a future where neuroimaging both miniaturizes and becomes widespread, 
augmenting the craft of authors, critics, agents and publishing houses. 
(Walter 2012)
Note that I have slipped into discussion of forms of materialism (and their rela-
tion to brains), perhaps unconsciously adopting the posture of the philoso-
pher. A different but complementary way of evaluating the more restrictive 
version of the neurophilosophical claims would be to look at precisely their 
twenty-first century outcomes, namely, claims from cognitive neuroscience 
and its extensions to deal with new areas like ethics, the law and the rest of 
8 Vygotsky, Pedologija Podrotska. Moscow, 1929. Quoted in van der Veer and Valsiner 1991, 
320. Further discussion in Wolfe 2010.
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“neurohumanities.” This is what “critical neuroscience” does (see Choudhury 
and Slaby 2012).
As its name indicates, the critical neuroscience program aims in part to 
criticize current developments, particularly in cognitive neuroscience (Choud-
hury, Nagel, and Slaby 2009, 73). This can include the already-familiar social 
critique of our fascination with brain imaging (fMRI, etc.), the newer critique of 
“brain-centric” explanations of personhood, agency, and moral life, and also, 
scientifically informed challenges to exaggerated, perhaps even ideological 
reports of neuroscientific findings in popular media (including in the neuropo-
litical sphere, as discussed below), but also in fields such as the “neurohuman-
ities.” Just as we are often confronted with bogus neuroscientific explanations 
in political decision-making or religious belief, similarly, certain current forms 
of neuro-aesthetic discourse will seek to augment literary scholarship by tell-
ing us that in reading literary prose, “the line ‘he had leathery hands’ has just 
stimulated your sensory cortex in a way ‘he had rough hands’ can never hope 
to” (Walter 2012). 
Conclusion
We have witnessed a series of tensions, most classically between a kind of 
Marx-Heidegger humanism and a purported brain science, and more interest-
ingly, between two visions of socially embedded, plastic brains, namely that of 
Tony Blair’s advisor versus the Vygotskian “socialist cortex,” i.e., the brain as 
potential Communist caisse de résonance. Similar but not identical to the latter 
opposition would be that between current discourses of neuronormativity, 
and the Vygotsky-Negri line in which brain science is not merely facilitating a 
state of socio-political status quo, but is potentially destabilizing.
The same applies to the opposition between types of materialism, in which 
the latter, more plastic variety also embraces “cultured brain” materialism. 
One can think of the Baldwin effect (in which cultural/linguistic evolution com-
bines with Darwinian evolution). The Baldwin effect is very close, in fact, to the 
promise of the social brain, namely, that “the human cerebral cortex [is] an 
organ of civilization in which are hidden boundless possibilities” (Luria 2002, 
22)9 and of course also to Deleuze’s “neuroaesthetic” vision in which “creating 
new circuits in art means creating them in the brain” (1995, 60). This Baldwin-
Vygotsky-Deleuze vision is tantamount to saying, to use Negri’s words, that 
“Geist is the brain.” Negri is deliberately being provocative with regard to the 
9  Luria is glossing on Vygotsky (1997), whose last, posthumously published work, “Psy-
chology and the Localization of Mental Functions” explicitly aimed to investigate the 
functional organization of the brain as the organ of consciousness (Luria 2002, 23). 
The development of new “functional organs” occurs through the development of new 
functional systems, which is a means for the unlimited development of cerebral activity 
(Luria 2002 19, 22). 
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German “hermeneutical” tradition, although his interests lie less in the realm 
of the social brain, and more towards a politics of affects (Negri 1995, 98). That 
properties of Geist such as its interpretive capacity, its social and intersubjec-
tive dimension, are in fact properties of the brain means—and I wish to insist 
on this point—that these are not just accounts of interaction between two 
distinct entities or fields of activity (e.g., brain and society, brain and symbolic 
relations, nature and freedom, etc.), nor an insistence that what matters is 
strictly the world of language in which we live, irreducible to the brain under-
stood as a passive machine.
A question left unspoken, but somehow present here, is: does the “social 
brain” materialist have to grant special ontological status to the brain? Does 
she have to hold, in the terms of “brain theorists” Thomas Metzinger and Vitto-
rio Gallese (2003, 549) that “the brain possesses an ontology too”? In the sense 
that, just as a theorist of cultural plasticity integrates more levels of analysis 
than a theorist of plasticity of the neural networks of the young rat, similarly, 
the social-brain materialist might allow for a richer account of what is specific 
about the brain in a materialist universe, compared to a mechanistic material-
ist or other, flatter forms of ontology, where there can be no “special zones.” 
For materialism sensu the identity theorist Place (1997) or his colleague Smart 
(1959), the brain does not have an ontology. There is physics, and anything 
above (both biology and neuroscience) is like a special kind of radio engineer-
ing (Smart 1959, 142). In contrast, in Sutton’s (2011) fluidity of animal spirits or 
Diderot’s description of the brain as “the book which reads itself,” it does. But 
how can materialism maintain that the brain has an ontology without reintro-
ducing “kingdoms within kingdoms” (in Spinoza’s celebrated way of describing 
the belief he challenged, that there were special laws and properties of human 
nature, different from the laws of nature as a whole)? One eloquent statement 
of how an interest in such plasticity can support an occasionally excessive 
claim for a kind of special ontological status is Victoria Pitts-Taylor’s critique 
of such a “wonder tissue” vision of the brain, as transcendental potentia or 
biopolitical monster (to use a phrase of Negri’s): 
The brain not only appears to us (through neuroscientific revelations) to 
be ontologically open to shaping, but (if the theory is right) it is always 
already actively shaped and shaping. Thus plasticity cannot be seen as an 
ontological condition captured, or not, by capital, or as a biological fact to 
be freed from social and cultural ones. (Pitts-Taylor 2010, 648)10 
10  Pitts-Taylor’s more general observation about the appeal of the concept of plasticity is 
worth citing: “For a number of scholars in a range of fields, plasticity offers the possibil-
ity of taking up the biological matter of the body while defying biological determinism. 
For sociologists of the body and medicine who have been looking for ways to overcome 
the limitations of social constructionism, brain plasticity appears to present the material 
body in a way that opens up, rather than closes down, sociocultural accounts of embod-
ied subjectivity. In psychology, plasticity may offer those opposed to materialist views 
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If we over-ontologise the brain in order to not be mystical dualists or knee-jerk 
anti-scientists, we may also run the risk of reconfiguring humanity as just “a 
cerebral crystallization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1991, 197),11 not unlike the way 
recent continental mystagogies of the brain in which “the frontier between the 
empirical and the transcendental is “deconstructed” within the materiality of 
the brain” (Williams 2013).
The other remaining question, which I have mentioned several times, is: if 
brain and politics are not two opposed spheres, does this have an emanci-
patory potential? The brain’s potentia against the rule-concept of potestas 
(the immanent and constitutive essence of a living being that desires what 
is good for its being, versus power as the transcendent power of command 
assumed by rulers). In similar tones Pasquinelli (2014, 298) approvingly cites 
Metzinger’s neuropedagogy and Consciousness Revolution as the “response 
of contemporary living labor to the regime of cognitive capitalism.” In fact, I 
like the sobering way Lazzarato puts it: art and culture are “neither more nor 
less integrated” into the society of control and security than any other activ-
ity, and they have “the same potential and ambiguities as any other activity” 
(2008, 174). There is little to be gained by investing either a substance (brain, 
frontal cortex, organism) or a potentiality with an absolute saving power. This, 
however, does not change the way in which a Spinozist politics of brain and 
affects (Wolfe 2014) is an improvement over those planifications which lay out 
a blueprint for action, with a hierarchy of actors assigned to their unmoving 
roles, à la DIAMAT and the dictatorship of the proletariat.
So, again: navigating between the Charybdis of apolitical neuronormativity, 
where Churchland becomes Philip K. Dick (. . . neurolegal attempts to identify 
psychopaths before they commit crimes), and the Scylla of comfortable Marx-
ist anti-naturalism, I find support in Negri’s provocative affirmation, Geist is 
the brain. But which brain? Neither the brain of forceps or MRI-wielding “men 
in white coats,” nor the brain of the bad neuro-aesthetic theorization of the 
experience of reading literary prose, which we saw with Walter above. 
Against static materialism I oppose the combined fervor of the Bolshevik 
invocation of the socialist cortex—as if, contrary to present, tedious attacks 
on the “dangerous naturalism” of thinkers like Virno, the true radical Marxism 
of both normative development and psychic suffering a way to account for physiological 
aspects of both without endorsing evolutionary or hard-wired views. For postmodern-
ists, poststructuralists, and others interested not only in displacing the liberal subject 
but also in productive alternatives, plasticity seems to offer positive chaos, creativity, 
and multisubjectivity. For those pursuing posthumanism at various levels, plasticity 
renders the world as an infinite source of “wideware” for the brain, and positions the 
individual brain as inherently connected to others—things, artifacts, other brains” 
(Pitts-Taylor 2010, 647). 
11  In response to the phenomenologist Erwin Straus’s “humanist” statement that “It is man 
who thinks, not the brain” (in Straus 1935, 183). 
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was in the brain (Wolfe 2010, Pasquinelli 2014)—and Negri’s incantatory asser-
tion that “the brain is the biopolitical monster” (cit. in Wolfe 2008). Granted, 
we might take a dose of deflationary realism towards such utopias; yet they 
are infinitely more sympathetic than the melancholy cynicism of the déraciné 
architecture theorists, the gleeful naïveté of metaphysicians of the prosthesis, 
or (again) the reactive, fearful anti-naturalisms, anti-cerebralisms of some our 
fellow-travelers.
Acknowledgments: Thanks to Matteo Pasquinelli and Pieter Present for their comments.
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